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	 1	
Introduction	
	 	
	 In	early	February	2012	news	began	to	spread	that	Wang	Lijun,	Chongqing’s	police	chief	and	Chongqing	Party	Secretary	Bo	Xilai	trustee,	had	gone	to	the	US	Consulate	in	Chengdu	to	seek	asylum.	Over	the	next	weeks	a	tale	of	corruption,	murder,	deceit	and	power	abuse	would	unravel,	shocking	China	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	These	events	also	gave	a	glimpse	into	the	secretive	world	of	elite	politics	in	China.			 Chongqing	had	by	this	time	already	become	a	household	name	for	many	in	China.	Since	2007	Bo	Xilai,	one	of	the	princelings	and	son	of	one	of	the	‘eight	immortals’	Bo	Yibo,	had	been	Party	Secretary.	Bo	began	a	large-scale	publicity	campaign	about	what	would	become	known	as	the	‘Chongqing	model’.	Some	argued	he	did	this	to	promote	a	new	vision	for	China’s	future,	which	he	was	cultivating	during	his	time	as	Party	Secretary	in	Chongqing.	Others	believe	Bo	was	openly	campaigning	for	a	spot	on	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee	and	only	using	the	publicity	for	that	reason.			 International	newspapers	and	scholars	began	to	pay	attention	after	the	Wang	Lijun	incident.	Who	was	this	strongman	Party	Secretary	in	Chongqing	and	what	was	happening	there?	Details	began	to	come	out	about	Bo	Xilai’s	tough	leadership	style	and	his	anti-corruption	campaign.	Focus	soon	also	shifted	to	the	other	aspects	of	Bo	Xilai’s	policies	in	Chongqing.	The	innovative	economic	strategy,	the	focus	on	equality,	social	housing	and	housing	registration	reform	programs	(hukou)	also	gained	attention.			 After	Bo	Xilai	was	removed	from	his	position	and	accused	of	corruption	and	abuse	of	power,	attention	shifted	to	the	world	of	elite	politics	in	China.	Bo	Xilai,	as	a	result	of	his	princeling	status	and	charisma,	had	been	seen	as	one	of	the	potential	candidates	for	a	position	on	the	2012	Politburo	Standing	Committee.	He	had	grown	very	popular	in	Chongqing	because	people	believed	he	was	focusing	on	issues	important	to	them.	In	fairness,	Chongqing	did	indeed	implement	policies	that	sought	to	tackle	growing	inequality,	criminality	and	corruption.	It	remains	questionable	however	to	what	extent	Bo	Xilai	would	have	sought	or	been	able	to	translate	this	to	the	national	level.			 One	of	the	reasons	Chongqing	became	such	a	hot	topic	in	China	was	the	media	war	between	Bo	Xilai	and	Wang	Yang,	the	Party	Secretary	in	Guangdong	province.	Bo	and	Wang	became	entangled	in	a	highly	publicized	debate	about	the	role	of	the	government	in	tackling	inequality.	For	Bo	the	Chongqing	model	showed	how	the	government	could	take	an	active	role	in	addressing	inequality.		Wang	on	the	other	hand	repeatedly	stated	the	role	of	the	government	was	to	‘make	the	cake	bigger’,	referring	to	economic	prosperity.	He	believed	that	a	focus	on	continued	economic	growth	was	the	government’s	main	concern,	not	how	to	divide	the	spoils	of	that	growth	equally.	This	confrontation	launched	a	battle	
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between	left	leaning	intellectuals,	collectively	known	as	the	New	Left,	and	more	liberal	intellectuals.	The	New	Left	latched	onto	the	Chongqing	model	for	its	leftist	tendencies,	and	focus	on	combatting	inequality.			 The	Chongqing	model	became	a	different	thing	for	varying	people	and	groups.	For	the	New	Left	it	represented	China’s	future,	and	the	first	serious	experiment	with	more	leftist	policies.	Mark	Leonard	described	the	rivalry	between	the	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	models	as	a	battle	for	‘China	3.0’	(Leonard	2012).	For	Bo	Xilai	it	served	his	political	ambitions	and	boosted	his	popularity	among	the	public	and	increased	attention	from	the	media.	Some	critics	disputed	altogether	the	existence	of	the	Chongqing	model.	This	paper	will	show	the	Chongqing	model	can	best	be	understood	as	a	political	project	used	by	Bo	Xilai	in	his	quest	for	a	seat	on	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee.			 Bo	Xilai	became	very	popular	among	Chongqing	residents	as	a	result	of	the	policies	of	the	Chongqing	model.	The	land	exchange	market	and	building	of	social	housing	coupled	with	hukou	reform	offered	an	alternative	to	rural	citizens	who	feared	the	consequences	of	losing	their	rural	land.	Bo’s	crackdown	on	organised	crime	and	corrupt	local	officials	also	proved	popular	with	citizens	who	felt	disadvantaged	by	the	ruling	system.	All	of	this	altered	Xi	Jinping’s	vision	on	the	importance	of	popularity	in	Chinese	politics.	By	analyzing	certain	aspects	of	Xi	Jinping’s	policies	it	is	evident	that	he	has	also	sought	to	increase	his	popularity	among	the	Chinese	population.				 Another	aspect	that	will	be	examined	is	how	Xi	Jinping	has	taken	over	various	policies	and	strategies	that	were	originally	employed	by	Bo	Xilai.	One	clear	example	is	the	anti-corruption	campaign	that	Bo	Xilai	succumbed	to.	There	are	also	other	examples.	For	instance	Xi	has	become	increasingly	focused	on	imbuing	a	nationalist	spirit	in	the	Chinese	population.	Furthermore,	China’s	current	economic	strategy	portrays	similarities	to	those	followed	in	Chongqing.		I	will	first	address	the	history	of	policy	experimentation	in	Chinese	politics.	Have	similar	models	or	experiments	existed	in	the	past	and	what	can	this	tell	us	about	the	Chongqing	model?	Next	the	Chongqing	model	will	be	deconstructed.	What	policies	made	up	the	model?	Which	of	these	were	examples	of	policy	experimentation?	What	do	the	policies	say	about	Bo	Xilai?	Third	the	economics	of	the	Chongqing	model	will	be	explained.	What	is	the	relationship	between	the	economic	and	social	policies	of	the	Chongqing	model?	Then	there	will	be	a	comparison	between	the	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	models	and	a	discussion	about	the	need	for	differing	policy	approaches	across	China.	Next	there	will	be	a	section	on	Bo	Xilai’s	use	of	the	model	for	his	personal	ambition,	the	rise	of	celebrity	politics	in	China	and	the	role	of	the	New	Left	in	legitimizing	the	Chongqing	model.	Finally,	Xi	Jinping’s	copying	of	certain	strategies	will	be	examined.		
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Methodology	
	
	
	 This	research	project	is	an	attempt	to	situate	the	Chongqing	model	in	Chinese	politics.	Various	primary	and	secondary	sources	will	be	analyzed	and	used	to	paint	a	picture	of	the	Chongqing	model	and	its	position	within	Chinese	politics.	How	have	the	discourses	about	the	Chongqing	model	influenced	the	understanding	of	it?	How	have	some	key	actors	spoken	about	the	Chongqing	model?	These	questions	will	be	answered	by	placing	this	debate	in	the	broader	literature	about	governance	in	China.		Sources	include	articles	by	Chinese	scholars	and	interviews	with	certain	key	actors	in	the	Chongqing	model.	Furthermore,	articles	by	other	scholars	focusing	on	Chongqing	and	Chinese	politics	will	also	be	used.	Another	important	source	of	information	is	the	national	and	international	media	and	how	these	have	written	about	Bo	Xilai	and	the	Chongqing	model.	As	will	be	argued	in	the	main	body	of	this	paper,	the	Chongqing	model	can	partially	be	seen	as	a	discursive	creation.	It	was,	in	part	at	least,	created	through	the	work	of	certain	scholars	and	media	appearances	by	Bo	Xilai	and	others.	Therefore	scholarly	sources	and	news	articles	from	national	and	international	media	are	essential	to	understand	the	discursive	nature	of	the	Chongqing	model.	These	articles	will	also	serve	as	the	main	source	of	information	about	the	specifics	of	the	policies	that	made	up	the	Chongqing	model.	On	the	basis	of	this	information	arguments	will	be	presented	to	show	how	the	Chongqing	model	can	best	be	understood,	what	the	Chongqing	model	meant	for	Bo	Xilai,	and	how	Xi	Jinping	has	emulated	certain	aspects	of	Bo	XIlai’s	strategy.	
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Policy	experimentation	in	Chinese	politics	
	 	Chinese	politics	has	a	long	history	of	policy	experimentation.	Since	the	early	days	of	the	CCP,	during	the	Japanese	occupation,	local	experiments	were	used	to	fine	tune	policies.	This	strategy	was	meant	to	find	innovative	solutions	to	social,	economic	and	political	problems.	Before	and	during	the	Japanese	occupation	the	communists	in	China	were	the	ruling	party	in	various	small,	mostly	rural,	townships.	In	the	late	1920s	Mao	Zedong	and	Deng	Zihui,	another	important	early	figure	in	the	CCP,	experimented	with	land	reform	(Heilmann	2008,	p.4).	This	model	of	governance	can	be	traced	from	the	land	reforms	in	the	1920s	to	current	day	China.	It	is	the	CCP’s	strategy	to	ensure	the	sustenance	of	the	Party’s	rule	under	ever	changing	circumstances.			 A	country	with	a	population	the	size	of	China’s	faces	challenges	that	are	of	a	much	larger	scale	than	most	other	countries.	Add	this	to	the	incredible	speed	at	which	China	has	developed	and	it	is	obvious	Chinese	policy	makers	rely	on	policy	flexibility	to	maintain	development.	This	flexibility	allows	Chinese	policy	makers	to	react	quickly	to	constantly	altering	situations.	China’s	history	of	policy	experimentation	is	important	to	the	discussion	about	the	Chongqing	model.	Some,	mostly	from	the	New	Left,	promoted	this	as	a	unique	occurrence	in	Chinese	politics.	However,	the	long	tradition	of	policy	experimentation	may	show	that	what	happened	in	Chongqing	was	just	another	attempt	at	finding	innovative	policy	solutions	to	contemporary	issues.			 Heilmann	argues	China’s	“permanent	revolution”	(2011,	p.7)	style	of	governance	allows	it	to	generate	“an	array	of	creative	–	proactive	as	well	as	evasive	–	tactics	for	managing	sudden	change	and	uncertainty”	(2011,	p.7).	China’s	large	geographic	size	requires	varying	policy	responses	to	ensure	continual	development.	This	was	clear	to	the	leaders	of	the	CCP	from	an	early	stage.	The	initial	experiments	aimed	at	finding	the	best	methods	for	land	distribution	and	local	governance.	The	party	leadership	at	the	time	encouraged	“party	organs	at	each	level	to	experiment	with	unconventional	measures	and	to	produce	diverse	models	for	emulation	by	other	localities”	(Heilmann	2008,	p.5).	In	the	1940s	policy	experimentation	was	adopted	as	an	official	governance	strategy	of	the	CCP	(Ibid,	p.7).				 Policy	experimentation	continued	to	be	an	essential	strategy	in	Chinese	governance.	Deng	Xiaoping	would	later	use	the	phrase	“crossing	the	river	by	groping	the	stones”	(Heilmann	2008,	p.12)1.	Experimentation	would	play	an	important	role	in	the	opening	up	period	under	Deng	Xiaoping.	In	1992	China’s	focus	on	using	policy	experimentation	was	included	in	the	constitution	of	the																																																									1	Heilmann	attributes	the	quote	to	Chen	Yun	rather	than	Deng	Xiaoping,	though	it	is	commonly	presented	as	a	statement	made	by	Deng.		
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CCP	(Heilmann	2008,	p.	26).	Other	scholars	also	examine	the	use	of	experimentation	in	China’s	policy	process	(Wang	S.	2011;	Hamrin	1984;	Mulvad	2015;	Huang	P.	2011;	Huang	Y.	2013;	Leonard	2012).						 Wang	Shaoguang,	a	Chinese	scholar	linked	to	the	New	Left	movement,	has	written	about	policy	experimentation	in	China’s	rural	healthcare	systems.	His	focus	is	on	the	rise	and	subsequent	replacement	of	the	cooperative	medical	stations	(CMS).	Wang	Shaoguang	sketches	four	distinct	periods	of	China’s	rural	healthcare	system,	the	rise	of	CMS,	the	universalization	of	CMS,	the	decline	of	CMS,	and	the	exploration	for	new	CMS	models	(2011,	p.104).	Wang	Shaoguang	shows	that	early	models	of	rural	healthcare	were	initiated	at	grassroots	level	and	then	picked	up	by	national	party	leaders.	He	then	explains	how	villages	were	given	the	freedom	within	the	CMS	system	to	implement	it	differently	according	to	the	needs	of	the	village.	Wang	Shaoguang’s	portrayal	of	policy	experimentation	in	rural	healthcare	aptly	portrays	the	long	history	of	this	strategy.			 Other	scholars	have	shown	how	this	strategy	was	used	for	economic	policies	(Huang	P,	2011;	Mulvad	2015),	a	carbon	trading	scheme	(Huang	Y,	2013),	social	structures	(Harmin	1984),	and	even	foreign	policy	(Sohn	2011).	As	shown	by	these	various	scholars	policy	experimentation	can	be	seen	in	most	areas	of	policy	making.	It	is	not	surprising	therefore	that	discussions	about	the	Chongqing	model	have	also	centered	on	policy	experimentation.	Some	of	the	policies	that	made	up	the	Chongqing	model	were	clear	attempts	at	using	experimentation	to	find	innovative	policy	solutions.	What	can	the	specifics	of	China’s	use	of	policy	experimentation	tell	us	about	the	Chongqing	model?			 	 Clearly,	Chinese-style	experimentation	must	not	be	mistaken	as	an	attempt	at	“scientific”,	“	evidence-based”	policy	selection.	At	every	stage,	from	setting	policy	objectives	to	selecting	model	experiments	and	identifying	generalizable	policy	options,	“proceeding	from	point	to	surface”	has	always	been	an	intensely	politicized	process	driven	by	competing	interests,	ideological	frictions,	personal	rivalries,	tactical	opportunism	or	ad	hoc	policy	compromises.	(Heilmann	2008,	p.28)		This	explanation	of	how	best	to	understand	policy	experimentation	in	Chinese	politics	offers	several	interesting	concepts	that	relate	to	discussions	about	the	Chongqing	model.	First	of	all	policy	experimentation	is	“an	intensely	politicized	process”	(Heilmann	2008,	p.28).	This	suggests	that	although	experimentation	is	desired	not	all	officials	can	engage	in	it	to	the	same	extent.	Bo	Xilai	and	Wang	Yang	were	both	senior	figures	within	the	CCP.	Bo	is	the	son	of	one	of	the	‘eight	immortals’,	Bo	Yibo.	Wang	Yang	is	a	member	of	the	so-called	tuanpai,	the	party	
	 6	
officials	who	rose	through	the	ranks	of	the	CCP’s	youth	league	(Li	2008).	Wang	Yang	also	had	strong	ties	to	Hu	Jintao	(Li	2008).	The	powerful	positions	Wang	Yang	and	Bo	had	within	the	Party’s	ranks	likely	played	a	roll	in	their	freedom	to	engage	in	policy	experimentation	in	Chongqing	and	Guangdong.			 Secondly,	Heilmann	states	policy	experimentation	can	often	be	seen	as	a	result	of	tactical	opportunism.	This	suggests	experimentation	does	not	only	stem	from	a	drive	for	innovation	and	problem	solving.	Instead,	party	officials	may	engage	in	experimentation	for	personal	reasons.	In	China’s	political	system	party	officials	rely	on	decisions	from	the	top	level	to	further	their	climb	within	the	Party’s	ranks.	Experimentation	offers	these	officials	a	chance	to	show	the	higher	officials	they	deserve	to	be	promoted.	For	many	it	seemed	likely	Bo	Xilai	was	using	his	time	in	Chongqing	as	a	launching	pad	to	get	a	senior	position	on	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee	in	2012	(Cheng	2013;	Fewsmith	2012).	Following	this	line	of	argumentation	it	can	be	said	that	Bo	Xilai	used	policy	experimentation	in	Chongqing	in	his	campaign	for	a	position	on	the	Standing	Committee.	The	policies	implemented	in	Chongqing	can	then	be	seen	as	a	form	of	tactical	opportunism,	rather	than	an	overall	vision	for	China’s	future.	This	will	be	elaborated	upon	later.			Clearly	policy	experimentation	occurs	in	many	different	styles	in	China.	From	healthcare	to	economic	policies	and	from	environmental	policies	to	foreign	policy,	it’s	all	there.	There	is	also	a	long	history	stretching	back	to	the	very	beginnings	of	the	Communist	Party	in	China.	Furthermore,	policy	experimentation	is	used	for	different	reasons.	Originally	it	was	used	out	of	necessity	(Heilmann	2008).	Nowadays	party	officials	sometimes	engage	in	experimentation	for	reasons	of	political	opportunism.	All	of	this	is	important	for	discussions	about	the	Chongqing	model.	The	following	chapter	will	examine	what	the	Chongqing	model	was	and	relate	parts	of	that	back	to	this	discussion	of	policy	experimentation	in	Chinese	politics.			
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The	Chongqing	Model	
	 Before	Bo	Xilai’s	sentencing	for	corruption	in	2013	there	was	a	lot	of	attention	for	his	work	in	Chongqing	between	2007	and	2012.	One	question	that	needs	to	be	answered	is	how	the	‘Chongqing	model’	can	be	defined?	This	requires	an	analysis	of	the	specific	policies	that	were	implemented	in	Chongqing	during	the	period	of	Bo	Xilai’s	leadership.		Was	the	Chongqing	model	simply	an	implementation	of	policies	supported	by	the	central	party	in	the	long	tradition	of	policy	experimentation?	Or	were	these	policies	part	of	a	bid	for	power	by	Bo	Xilai?	Furthermore	what	aspects	of	the	Chongqing	model	can	be	found	in	Xi	Jinping’s	China?			Scholars	still	disagree	about	whether	it	is	possible	to	speak	of	a	‘Chongqing	model’.	Some	say	that	it	does	not	represent	a	new	system	and	thus	cannot	be	thought	of	as	a	model	(Chan	2011).	Others,	including	many	from	the	New	Left,	do	write	about	it	as	a	model,	and	believe	it	to	be	a	distinct	approach	to	politics	and	governance	in	China	(Cui	2011,	Wang,	S.	2009).	By	exploring	what	happened	in	Chongqing	under	the	rule	of	Bo	Xilai	and	Huang	Qifan	an	attempt	will	be	made	to	address	this	debate.			 There	is	a	wide	range	of	policies	that	made	up	the	Chongqing	model,	stretching	from	public	housing	to	anti-corruption	campaigns.	In	2008	Chongqing	municipality	announced	the	‘Five	Chongqings’	plan	(五个重庆).	This	included	policies	aimed	at	housing,	transport,	safety,	the	environment	and	public	health.	Furthermore,	the	municipality	experimented	with	reforms	of	the	hukou	and	rural	land	rights	systems.	Some	of	these	policies	were	experimental,	but	sanctioned	by	the	central	party	leadership.	Others	were	similar	to	what	most	local	governments	attempt	to	achieve	for	their	citizens.	Most	leaders	aim	to	improve	transport,	safety	and	public	health.	Chongqing	was	different	in	some	respects	because	of	the	approach	it	took	to	address	these	issues.	Below	we	will	examine	what	policies	were	implemented	as	part	of	the	Chongqing	model.	All	of	this	will	serve	to	examine	to	what	extent	the	Chongqing	model	was	a	personal	project	of	Bo	Xilai	or	if	this	was	truly	a	radical	experiment	in	Chinese	politics.	It	will	also	show	what	aspects	Xi	Jinping	has	copied.				
Social	Housing	
		 Some	of	the	issues	the	Chongqing	model	was	attempting	to	address	were	and	are	still	found	throughout	China.	At	the	launch	of	the	Chongqing	model	in	2007	China	was	struggling	with	housing.	There	was	a	lot	of	attention	in	China	“about	rising	property	prices	and	most	young	people	[felt]	that	they	[could]	no	longer	afford	to	buy	their	own	accommodation”	(Cheng	2013,	p.	415).	Part	of	the	Chongqing	model	was	aimed	at	dealing	with	the	issue	of	limited	and	expensive	
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housing.	The	plan	set	out	to	increase	per	capita	accommodation	space	for	urban	residents	to	30	million	square	meters	in	2012	and	35	in	2017	(Cheng	2013,	p.	416).	The	Chongqing	municipal	government	would	also	spend	billions	on	building	social	housing	for	the	cities	poorer	citizens.	This	included	housing	for	the	large	group	of	economic	migrants	living	in	Chongqing.			 Social	housing	in	China	has	gone	through	various	changes	since	the	establishment	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	in	1949.2	Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	split	China’s	social	housing	policy	in	four	different	periods,	from	1949-1977,	1978-1998,	1999-2011	and	since	2011.	The	two	important	periods	for	our	purposes	are	the	‘market	period’	(1999-2011)	and	the	‘comprehensive	period’	(after	2011)	(Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015,	p.2).	In	1988	the	central	government	decided	to	increase	marketization	of	housing.	The	new	aim	of	China’s	housing	policy	was	to	make	housing	“a	commodity	that	should	be	provided	and	consumed	in	the	open	market	based	on	market	principles”	(Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015,	p.3).	After	this	call	for	marketization,	the	Chinese	housing	market	in	1999	entered	a	‘market	dominant’	period.	Concretely	this	resulted	in	the	percentage	of	commodity	housing	rising	from	“50%	in	the	late	1990s	to	about	85%	after	2005”.			 This	rapid	increase	in	the	percentage	of	commodity	housing	coincided	with	the	period	of	rapid	economic	development	and	urbanization	in	China.	This	rapid	development	was	due	in	large	part	to	the	availability	of	migrant	workers,	China’s	so-called	‘floating	population’.	The	marketization	focus	of	China’s	housing	policy	had	a	strong	negative	impact	on	the	affordability	of	housing	for	Chinese	citizens.	After	increasing	criticism	about	this,	in	2006,	the	central	government	launched	a	new	phase	in	housing	policy	(Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015).	This	new	phase	was	aimed	at	increasing	the	availability	of	subsidized	housing	for	lower	income	families,	for	instance	China’s	floating	population.	The	central	government	set	new	quotas	for	land	earmarked	for	social	housing.			 The	period	from	2006-2011,	with	its	focus	on	the	provision	of	social	housing,	is	an	indication	of	the	general	trend	in	China’s	housing	policy.	There	are	clear	similarities	to	the	social	housing	focus	in	the	Chongqing	model.	However,	the	Chongqing	model	was	more	progressive	than	the	central	government’s	national	policy.	The	housing	policy	pursued	in	Chongqing	from	2007	onwards	served	as	a	pilot	project	for	China’s	national	housing	policy.			 The	predominant	form	of	social	housing	in	China	came	in	the	form	of	Economic	Comfortable	Housing	(ECH).	Local	governments	could	sell	“specially	allocated	land	(with	no	or	a	lower	land	lease	fee)	…	free	of	municipal	tax	and	other	administrative	fees	to	government-contracted	developers”	(Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015,	p.	14).	As	a	result	of	the	lower	profitability	of	ECH	land	for	local	governments	however,	there	was	little	promotion	of	this	policy	by																																																									2	For	a	complete	overview	of	the	social	housing	policies	from	1949	to	2013	see	Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015.		
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local	governments.	According	to	an	article	in	the	National	Business	Daily	the	ministry	is	considering	ending	the	ECH	program	(Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015,	p.14).		The	Chongqing	government,	therefore,	followed	a	different	path	to	tackle	the	lack	of	social	housing.	The	ECH	policy	was	abolished	and	instead	the	Chongqing	government	focused	on	the	Low-Rent	Housing	scheme	(LRH)	and	Public	Rental	Housing	scheme	(PRH).		The	LRH	program	was	aimed	at	low-income	groups	with	a	local	urban	hukou.	The	PRH	program	was	also	aimed	at	low-income	groups,	but	did	not	require	a	local	urban	hukou.	In	2013	the	central	government	announced	its	plans	to	unify	the	LRH	and	PRH	programs	(Deng,	Hoekstra	and	Elsinga	2015).		Social	housing	also	featured	in	the	national	12th	Five	Year	Plan	(2011-2015).	A	review	of	the	12th	Five	Year	Plan	shows	that	local	governments	racked	up	high	levels	of	debt	and	a	large	real	estate	bubble	was	created	(Mai	2015).	This	shows	similarities	to	the	focus	on	government	spending	that	was	characteristic	of	the	Chongqing	model.	The	Chongqing	model’s	focus	on	government	spending	in	the	field	of	housing	can	be	seen	in	the	large	public	housing	construction	projects	that	took	place	between	2007	and	2012.		Nevertheless,	targets	for	affordable	housing	set	in	the	12th	Five	Year	Plan	were	not	met.	Doubts	remain	about	the	Chongqing	model’s	ability	to	stimulate	a	culture	change	in	Chinese	politics.	A	clear	focus	of	the	Chongqing	model	was	to	‘share	the	cake	more	equally’,	which	included	more	options	for	affordable	housing.		 What	this	discrepancy	between	the	ideals	of	the	Chongqing	model	and	the	realities	of	China’s	development	between	2011	and	2015	in	the	field	of	housing	may	point	to	is	the	largely	rhetorical	role	this	focus	played	in	Bo	Xilai’s	vision	for	China.	This	would	support	the	idea	that	for	Bo	the	Chongqing	model	was	merely	a	political	project	aimed	at	increasing	his	status	within	the	party.	This	is	backed	up	by	the	fact	that	by	the	end	of	2012	the	Chongqing	government	had	only	managed	to	fund	the	building	of	some	6.6	million	square	meters	of	housing,	far	short	of	the	intended	target	of	30	million	square	meters	(Shih	2013).				 The	focus	of	China’s	national	housing	policy	did,	however,	end	up	following	the	strategy	that	was	experimented	with	in	Chongqing.	While	Bo	Xilai	may	have	used	this	policy	as	a	rhetorical	tool	in	his	personal	campaign,	Chongqing	did	serve	as	a	proving	ground	for	a	new	national	focus	on	the	PRH	program.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Party	officials	have	used	policy	experimentation	for	tactical	reasons	before.				
Land	Exchange	Market	
		 The	public	housing	campaign	was	coupled	with	two	other	policy	reforms	in	Chongqing.	The	first	was	the	creation	of	China’s	“first	and	only	‘land	exchange	market’	…	in	December	2008”	(Cui	2011,	p.649).	The	second	was	the	massive	
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extension	of	urban	hukou	in	Chongqing.	The	combination	of	these	two	policies	led	to	the	increased	need	for	affordable	public	housing.	Between	August	2010	and	July	2011	some	“two	million	rural	migrant	workers	changed	their	household	registration	from	rural	residence	to	urban	residence.”	(Cui	2011,	p.652)			 The	creation	of	a	land	exchange	market	in	Chongqing	was	a	clear	sign	of	policy	experimentation.	This	was	an	unprecedented	project	that	sought	to	address	two	of	China’s	national	policy	goals:	speeding	up	the	synchronized	development	of	urban	and	rural	areas	and	maintaining	“1.8	billion	mu	[1.2	trillion	square	meters]	of	cultivated	land	to	ensure	the	country’s	food	supply”	(Cui	2011,	p.649).	The	land	exchange	model	allows	farmers	to	convert	their	land	to	make	it	available	for	cultivation	and	then	sell	the	certificates	for	using	the	land	to	developers.	These	developers	are	then	allowed,	“to	purchase	land-use	rights	in	urban	areas	and	develop	that	land.”	(Cui	2011,	p.650)			 Chongqing’s	Mayor	Huang	Qifan,	who	together	with	Bo	Xilai	was	responsible	for	the	implementation	of	the	Chongqing	model,	stated	the	unused	rural	land	issue	was	a	problem	for	the	whole	of	China	(Huajie	2015).	The	massive	number	of	migrant	workers	in	China	who	moved	from	rural	areas	to	urban	areas	for	temporary	work	left	behind	large	areas	of	unused	rural	land.	Before	the	implementation	of	the	land	exchange	market	the	only	way	to	make	use	of	this	land	was	if	local	governments	expropriated	land	after	approval	from	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Resources.	This	appropriation	of	land	by	the	government	is	of	course	deeply	unpopular	among	the	rural	population.	The	land	exchange	market	offered	farmers	the	opportunity	to	sell	their	land	rights	to	developers,	creating	a	market	for	unused	rural	land.			 The	inspiration	for	the	land	exchange	market	is	likely	to	have	come	from	a	document	released	by	Ministry	of	Land	and	Resources	in	2005	titled	‘An	opinion	
on	regulating	the	experiment	of	linking	up	increased	land	use	for	urban	
development	with	decreased	non-agricultural	land	use	in	rural	areas’.	According	to	the	Minsitry	of	Land	and	Resources	local	governments’	quotas	for	urban	development	could	be	expanded	if	farmers	or	rural	industries	had	converted	non-used	rural	land	for	cultivation.	Although	Cui	Zhiyuan	labled	the	Chongqing	land	exchange	market	as	“China’s	first	and	only”,	this	is	not	entirely	accurate	(Cui	2011,	p.649).	A	similar	project	was	launched	around	the	same	time	in	Chengdu,	a	prefecture-level	city	and	the	capital	of	Sichuan	province.	The	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	land	markets	though	similar	in	what	they	tried	to	achieve,	contain	some	significant	differences.	Before	explaining	these	differences	it	is	important	to	understand	the	background	of	China’s	land	use	policy.				 There	is	an	official	policy	from	the	central	government	governing	land	use	for	all	provinces,	municipalities	and	cities.	The	policy	tries	to	balance	the	needs	for	more	urban	development	and	preservation	of	agricultural	land.	More	weight	
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is	given	to	agricultural	preservation	than	urbanization.3	This	has	created	a	‘one-size	fits	all’	system	of	land	use	regulation	for	all	Chinese	cities.	The	National	Land-use	Master	Plan	Outline,	the	official	government	policy	governing	land	use,	sets	hard	quotas	for	preservation	of	agricultural	land	and	construction	land.	The	quotas	are	set	annually	at	the	central	government	level	and	then	passed	down	to	the	provincial,	municipal	and	city	level.			 China’s	uneven	development	and	the	geological	differences	between	provinces	add	extra	pressure	to	this	‘one-size	fits	all’	system	of	land	quotas.	Some	provinces	and	cities	are	experiencing	rapid	economic	growth	and	urbanization	and	some	areas	of	China	are	less	suitable	for	agricultural	production.	As	a	result	many	Chinese	cities	are	struggling	with	limited	quotas	for	urban	development.	There	was	a	need	for	new	policies	that	could	provide	solutions	to	the	dual	problem	of	limited	quotas	for	urban	development	and	the	preservation	of	agricultural	land.	The	land	exchange	markets	created	in	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	deal	with	both	of	these	problems,	offering	a	sustainable	solution	to	urbanization.			 In	2007	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	were	named	Pilot	Areas	for	the	Comprehensive	Reform	for	Balanced	Urban-Rural	Development	(Li,	p.	50).	The	central	government	hoped	the	tried	and	tested	strategy	of	policy	experimentation	could	lead	to	innovative	policies	for	land	use.	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	were	given	the	freedom	to	stray	from	the	central	government’s	regulations	on	land	use.			 Both	the	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	land	exchange	markets	are	based	on	the	trading	of	‘quota	rights’.	Converting	rural	land	back	to	agricultural	land	after	farmers	have	resettled	in	urban	areas	is	how	quotas	are	made.	The	creation	of	the	land	exchange	markets	led	to	the	creation	of	“a	new	profession	of	‘quota	developers’”	(Xiao	2015,	p.	9).	Quota	developers	are	responsible	for	“the	process	of	demolition,	resettlement	and	reclamation”	of	rural	land	(Xiao	2015,	p.9).	This	is	where	the	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	land	exchange	markets	differ.	Whereas	in	Chengdu	there	is	a	focus	on	private	quota	developers,	in	Chongqing	the	local	government	exclusively	fulfills	this	role.			 The	differences	in	approach	can	be	explained	by	the	focus	on	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	Chongqing	model.	A	recurring	theme	in	the	various	policies	that	formed	the	Chongqing	model	is	the	strong	role	of	the	state	in	leading	society	and	development.	It	is	not	surprising	therefore	that	in	the	land	exchange	market	the	local	government	would	take	such	an	important	role	upon	itself.	The	focus	on	the	role	of	the	state	in	combatting	inequality	in	Chongqing	can	be	explained	by	Bo	Xilai’s	belief	that	this	would	be	well	received	by	the	masses.	Bo	believed																																																									3	Yuan	Xiao	explains	this	in	a	2015	paper:	“In	the	planning	process,	the	country	sets	up	a	target	for	the	size	of	arable	land	to	be	preserved.	The	projection	of	the	size	of	new	urban	land	development	is	based	more	on	the	target	of	arable	land	protection	than	on	a	projection	of	economic	and	population	growth.”	(p.	7)		
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implementing	popular	policies	raised	his	political	profile	and	increased	his	chances	of	promotion	to	the	Standing	Committee.		There	is	another	significant	difference	between	the	two	land	exchange	markets.	“In	Chengdu	all	real	estate	developers	are	required	to	buy	quota,	and	in	that	case,	quotas	work	more	like	a	tax	or	a	fee	rather	than	representing	any	property	right.”	(Xiao	2015,	p.10)		In	Chongqing	the	quotas	more	truly	represent	property	rights	as	the	developers	are	given	“special	privileges	such	as	picking	their	own	land	parcels”	(Xiao	2015,	p.10).		Chongqing’s	land	exchange	market	has	generated	some	30	billion	yuan,	“of	which	6	billion	yuan	was	paid	to	migrant	workers	who	moved	into	cities”	(Huajie	2015).	According	to	Huang	Qifan,	“over	the	past	few	years,	Chongqing	has	not	seen	a	decline	in	its	amount	of	farmland”	(Huajie	2015).	This	suggests	that	the	land	exchange	market	was	successful	in	tackling	the	dual	problem	of	urbanization	and	available	agricultural	land.	The	success	of	the	land	exchange	market	in	China,	and	its	continued	existence	make	this	a	policy	that	could	translate	to	the	national	level.	The	land	exchange	market	will	not	be	applicable	to	all	cities	in	China,	but	the	wish	of	the	central	government	to	spur	development	in	Western	regions	means	there	are	plenty	of	urban	areas	where	similar	schemes	might	be	implemented.			 The	Chengdu	and	Chongqing	land	exchange	markets	were	only	made	possible	by	the	decision	of	the	Ministry	of	land	and	Resources	to	name	these	two	areas	as	‘experimental	zones’,	allowing	them	to	implement	innovative	policies	(Xiao	2015,	p.14).	This	points	to	a	more	top-down	nature	of	policy	experimentation	in	China.	However,	the	land	exchange	experiment	was	an	attempt	by	local	governments	to	change	regulations	set	by	the	central	government,	while	being	authorized	by	the	central	government.	The	lack	of	applicability	to	other	regions	in	China	again	points	to	the	idea	that	much	of	the	Chongqing	model	was	aimed	at	raising	Bo	Xilai’s	political	profile.			
Hukou	reform	 		 To	go	along	with	Chongqing’s	reforms	of	social	housing	and	rural	land	use	policies	the	local	government	was	also	allowed	o	experiment	with	hukou	reform.	All	three	of	these	issues	are	closely	connected	and	form	the	greatest	challenges	to	narrowing	the	urban-rural	gap	in	China.	China’s	development	since	the	opening	up	period	under	Deng	Xiaoping	has	mostly	been	spurred	by	economic	growth	in	large	urban	areas	in	China’s	Eastern	coastal	provinces.	As	mentioned	earlier,	China’s	large	floating	population	of	migrant	workers	greatly	contributed	to	this	development.	However,	the	urban	population	mostly	benefitted	from	the	resulting	growth	in	income.	As	a	result,	the	central	government	has	for	many	years	stated	a	wish	to	address	this	urban-rural	gap.	Since	2002	this	has	been	a	policy	focus	of	the	central	government	(Zhong	2011,	p.	353).		
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	 Experimenting	with	hukou	reform	was	also	part	of	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	being	named	Pilot	Areas	for	the	Comprehensive	Reform	for	Balanced	Urban-Rural	Development.	Experimenting	with	hukou	reform	in	a	city	the	size	of	Chengdu,	which	has	some	14	million	inhabitants,	was	a	large	step.	Granting	the	same	power	to	Chongqing,	with	its	30	million	citizens,	was	an	even	bolder	step	in	China’s	aim	to	reform	the	hukou	policy.	Hukou	reform	had	been	on	the	central	government’s	agenda	since	2002	and	restrictions	on	the	issuing	of	urban	hukous	had	been	lifted	for	small	cities	and	relaxed	for	medium	sized	cities.	However,	the	experimental	status	of	Chongqing	and	Chengdu	allowed	the	local	governments	to	go	further	in	an	attempt	to	find	solutions	to	the	hukou	problem.			 In	2010	the	Chongqing	government	set	a	target	to	issue	3	and	10	million	urban	hukous	to	rural	citizens	by	2012	and	2020	respectively	(Zhong	2011,	p.358).	In	a	2015	interview	Huang	Qifan	stated,	“over	the	past	few	years,	a	total	of	4	million	rural	workers	and	their	families	have	received	urban	hukou	in	Chongqing”	(Huajie	2015).	Considering	the	stated	goal	of	3	million	new	urban	residents	by	2012,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	Chongqing	is	behind	on	schedule,	but	not	by	much.	The	hukou	reform	in	Chongqing	seems,	therefore,	to	have	been	partially	successful.	Therefore	it	is	possible	similar	strategies	will	be	translated	to	the	national	level	at	some	point	in	the	near	future.			 The	hukou	reform	in	Chongqing	was	different	from	that	in	other	areas	because	it	did	not	require	rural	migrants	to	give	up	their	land	rights.	As	explained	above,	rural	migrants	could	choose	to	return	their	land	to	agricultural	status	and	sell	it	on	the	land	exchange	market.	They	were	also	permitted	to	retain	their	land	and	the	rights	that	come	with	it.	Across	China	there	was	opposition	to	the	hukou	reform	from	rural	migrants	who	lacked	long	term	security	in	urban	areas.	Fearing	that	they	might	lose	their	jobs	in	the	cities,	retaining	their	rural	land	gave	them	a	fall	back	option	should	things	go	south.	The	unique	approach	implemented	in	Chongqing,	therefore,	attempted	to	make	transferring	from	a	rural	to	urban	hukou	more	appealing	to	rural	migrants.	The	
hukou	reform	in	Chongqing	had	a	single	requirement:	that	migrant	workers	have	worked	in	the	city	for	more	than	five	years.	In	this	way	the	local	government	attempted	to	ease	the	financial	burden	hukou	reform	would	place	on	social	services.			 The	hukou	reform	policies	implemented	in	Chongqing	were,	partly	at	least,	mirrored	in	the	national	plans	for	hukou	reform	that	were	announced	by	President	Xi	Jinping	in	February	2015	(Tiezzi	2015).	The	central	government	announced	its	goal	of	achieving	a	60	percent	urbanization	rate	by	2020.	Hukou	reform	is	an	essential	aspect	of	achieving	this	target.	The	national	hukou	reform	announced	by	Xi	Jinping	was	aimed	at	“‘suitable	people’	…	who	are	both	‘capable	of	maintaining	jobs	and	comfortable	in	cities’”	(Tiezzi	2015).	The	hukou	reform	had	several	criteria	“including	employment,	housing	and	length	of	stay”	(Tiezzie	2015).	In	hukou	reform	we	find	another	policy	area	that	Xi	Jinping	also	acted	on	after	the	experiments	in	Chongqing.	Hukou	reform	has	long	been	a	controversial	
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topic	in	China,	and	it	is	likely	this	would	have	been	addressed	regardless	of	the	events	in	Chongqing.	Nonetheless,	Xi	Jinping’s	personal	involvement	in	announcing	changes	to	this	policy	show	the	importance	he	believes	this	has	in	China.					 Although	Chongqing’s	hukou	reform	policy	was	translated	to	the	national	level,	albeit	on	a	smaller	scale,	the	land	exchange	market	has	so	far	not	received	the	same	treatment.	In	Chongqing	these	two	policies	formed	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	The	local	government	knew	that	solving	the	twin	problems	of	urbanization	and	agricultural	land	protection	was	only	possible	if	both	were	tackled	in	conjunction.	So	far	this	dual	approach	is	missing	at	the	national	policy	level.			 Some	have	also	questioned	in	how	far	this	was	truly	a	real	reform	of	the	
hukou	system.	All	the	regulations	were	still	in	place,	it	had	just	become	easier	for	citizens	to	apply	for	an	urban	hukou.	The	policy	experimented	with	in	Chongqing	is	thus	a	superficial	fix	to	a	much	deeper	structural	problem.	It	is	unclear	whether	Bo	Xilai	could	have	gone	further	with	these	reforms,	but	the	fact	remains.	To	the	outside	world	and	many	citizens	this	seemed	as	a	huge	step	and	contributed	to	Bo	Xilai	and	the	Chongqing	models’	popularity.			
Healthcare	reforms	
		 Healthcare	was	another	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model.	The	objectives	set	out	in	the	Jiangkang	Chongqing	approach	were:	“(1)	the	quality	of	health	of	the	people	in	Chongqing	should	exceed	the	national	level;	(2)	the	level	of	health	insurance	enjoyed	by	the	people	in	Chongqing	should	be	in	the	front	rank	of	western	China;	and	(3)	the	cultivation	of	healthy	behavior	patterns	on	the	part	of	people	in	Chongqing	should	be	basically	completed.”	(Cheng,	p.420-421)	Concretely	this	meant	an	increase	in	life	expectancy	to	77	years	by	2012	and	that	by	2020	all	citizens	should	have	access	to	basic	medical	insurance,	medical	and	health	services,	and	safe	food	and	drinking	water	(Cheng,	p.421).			 Similarly	to	other	areas	of	policy	making	after	the	economic	reform	period	of	Deng	Xiaoping,	the	health	care	system	that	had	been	centrally	organized	was	pushed	towards	marketization.	As	with	most	societal	issues	in	China	tensions	between	the	promoters	of	the	market	approach	and	those	of	the	governmental	approach	continued	(read	liberals	and	leftists).	Recently	the	central	government	has	announced	its	intention	to	find	a	middle	way	between	these	two	systems	(Ho	2011,	p.1).	The	central	party	announced	its	health	care	reforms	“will	adopt	a	‘people-first’	approach,	based	on	an	understanding	of	health	care	as	a	basic	public	good	provided	to	the	entire	population	for	its	common	welfare”	(Ho	2011,	p.2).			 Besides	the	mention	of	health	care	as	one	of	the	areas	of	focus	for	Chongqing	in	the	‘Five	Chongqings’	plan,	there	is	little	evidence	showing	Chongqing	experimented	with	significantly	different	health	care	policies	than	the	
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rest	of	China.	Despite	this,	there	is	evidence	showing	some	aspects	of	Chongqing’s	health	care	approach	outperformed	the	national	targets.	This	took	place	before	Bo	Xilai	was	named	Party	Secretary	of	Chongqing	and	the	launch	of	the	Chongqing	model.	After	implementing	a	new	form	of	health	care	insurance	for	urban	and	rural	residents	in	2003,	coverage	had	reached	100	percent	by	2007.	This	was	three	years	ahead	of	the	national	plan	(Xu,	Ailong	&	Jun	2013).	As	this	took	place	before	the	Chongqing	model	was	launched	under	Bo	Xilai	the	results	cannot	be	counted	towards	a	support	of	the	Chongqing	model.			 Nevertheless,	Chongqing	under	Bo	Xilai’s	leadership	continued	to	show	strong	results	in	health	care	insurance	reform.	Various	programs	aimed	at	increasing	health	care	insurance	coverage	showed	strong	improvements.		
	In	 2011,	 the	 number	 of	 participants	 in	 the	 urban	employees	basic	medical	insurance	scheme	reached	4.58	million,	an	increase	of	12.9%	over	the	previous	year;	 the	 number	 of	 participants	 in	 the	 industrial	injuries	 insurance	 scheme	 rose	 to	 3.32	 million,	 an	increase	 of	 24.8%	 over	 the	 previous	 year;	 and	 the	number	 of	 participants	 in	 the	 pregnancy	 insurance	scheme	 amounted	 to	 2.15	 million,	 an	 increase	 of	23.3%.	 Migrant	 workers	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 major	illness	 medical	 insurance	 scheme	 numbered	 0.33	million,	showing	an	increase	of	43.8%;	and	migrant	workers	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 industrial	 injuries	insurance	scheme	reached	1.24	million,	an	increase	of	18.5%	(Chongqing	Municipal	Statistics	Bureau	&	Chongqing	 Investigation	 Principal	 Team,	 National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2012).	4		These	figures	show	significant	improvement	in	health	care	insurance	coverage	in	Chongqing.	As	an	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model	it	can	be	argued	this	shows	health	care	was	an	important	issue	for	the	local	government.	This	supports	the	ideological	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model,	strong	government	involvement	in	improving	the	lives	of	ordinary	citizens.		This	is	backed	up	by	a	recent	controversy	in	Chongqing	regarding	health	care	reforms.	Protests	erupted	in	Chongqing	on	March	29th	2016	after	the	local	government	announced	reforms	that	would	result	in	higher	prices	for	dialysis	treatment	(Lu	2015).	The	immediate	action	of	the	government	was	to	clamp	down	on	the	protests	and	forbid	media	coverage,	but	photos	and	stories	of	the	
																																																								4	Quoted	in	Cheng,	J.Y.S.	2013,	The	“Chongqing	Model”	What	It	Means	to	China	Today,	Journal	of	Comparative	Asian	Development,	12:3,	411-442	
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protests	ended	up	on	Weibo	regardless.	After	criticism	erupted	on	Weibo	the	local	government	backtracked	and	announced	it	would	suspend	the	reforms.		The	noteworthy	aspect	of	the	fallout	over	the	health	care	reforms	was	that	various	Weibo	users	used	this	controversy	as	a	way	to	reminisce	the	days	when	Bo	Xilai	was	still	in	power.	One	user	wrote,	“he	[Bo	Xilai]	was	actually	concerned	with	the	people’s	welfare”	(Lu	2015).	The	public	support	for	Bo	Xilai	suggests	health	care	policies	during	his	leadership	were	considered	more	in	line	with	the	public’s	wishes.	This	also	points	to	a	departure	from	the	stated	goals	of	the	Chongqing	model	since	Bo’s	removal	from	power.	It	must	be	mentioned,	however,	that	the	proposed	reforms	would	have	lowered	prices	on	other	treatments	and	tests.	The	public	outrage,	therefore,	can	also	be	considered	to	be	somewhat	misplaced.	The	nostalgia	for	Bo	Xilai	three	years	after	his	imprisonment	does	show	how	popular	he	was	and	still	is	in	Chongqing.	This	shows	how	Bo	used	the	Chongqing	model	to	raise	his	profile.			
Dahei				 Two	of	the	most	talked	about	and	controversial	aspects	of	the	Chongqing	model	were	the	changhong	and	dahei	campaigns.	These	two	campaigns	had	a	symbiotic	relationship	serving	to	address	one	of	the	most	pressing	concerns	of	the	Chinese	population,	corruption,	and	simultaneously	improve	trust	in	the	government	and	stimulate	a	feeling	of	unity.			 Corruption	is	an	often-found	problem	in	states	with	a	one	party	system.	In	China	this	is	no	different.	The	Chinese	population	regularly	has	to	deal	with	corrupt	officials	throughout	all	levels	of	government.	The	CCP	has	increasingly	become	aware	of	the	threat	this	poses	to	the	long-term	stability	of	the	regime.	Large-scale	social	unrest	must	be	avoided	at	all	costs	and	the	actions	of	the	CCP	are	geared	towards	preventing	this.	Corruption	has	become	more	apparent	with	the	increasing	prosperity	in	China.	The	richer	and	more	powerful	members	of	society	are	believed	to	be	enriching	themselves	at	the	expense	of	the	lower	classes	and	this	is	becoming	clearer	as	China’s	economy	grows	(Bell	2015).	There	is	also	still	a	strong	presence	of	gangs	and	mafia	in	China.			 The	dahei,	or	‘strike	black’	anti-crime	campaign	aimed	to	crackdown	on	organized	crime	in	the	Chongqing	municipality.	Many	believed	organized	crime	and	corruption	had	been	“left	to	flourish”	(Cabestan,	p.8)	under	Bo	Xilai’s	predecessor,	Wang	Yang.	The	strike	black	campaign	“targeted	‘red-black	collusions’	(between	officials	and	gangs	that	monopolized	markets	through	violence”	(Broadhurst	&	Wang	2013).	One	reason	the	dahei	campaign	has	become	so	controversial	was	because	it	played	hard	and	fast	with	judicial	impartiality	and	due	process.	As	part	of	the	dahei	campaign	Bo	“ordered	the	arrests	of	an	estimated	5,000	people	for	illegal	prostitution,	operating	gambling	dens,	weapons	possession	and	other	crimes.”	(Wagner	2011).			
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After	being	appointed	party	secretary	in	Chongqing	Bo	Xilai	chose	Wang	Lijun	to	serve	as	the	head	of	public	security	in	the	city.	Bo	knew	Wang	from	his	time	in	Liaoning	province,	where	he	had	been	at	the	head	of	various	anticorruption	police	actions.	After	his	transfer	to	Chongqing,	Wang	Lijun	became	responsible	for	the	implementation	of	the	dahei	campaign.	This	campaign	was	effective	in	fighting	corruption,	but	was	often	criticized	for	its	“disregard	for	legal	procedures	and	confessions	extracted	through	torture”	(Anderlini	2012).	That	Bo	Xilai	was	able	to	take	Wang	Lijun	with	him	to	Chongqing	was	a	remarkable	feat.	In	China	high	officials	are	appointed	by	the	party	structures,	and	handpicking	officials	is	rare.		Chongqing’s	anticorruption	campaign	caught	national	and	international	media	attention	in	2009	when	high	level	bosses	of	Chongqing’s	gangs	and	various	high	level	current	and	former	public	officials	were	put	on	trial.	Also	on	trial	was	Wen	Qiang,	the	head	of	Chongqing’s	justice	bureau	(Economist	2009).	Anticorruption	campaigns	were	not	unheard	of	in	China	before	the	strike	black	campaign	in	Chongqing.	The	amount	of	high	level	targets,	however,	did	make	this	effort	stand	out.		The	trials	not	only	sought	to	break	up	various	organized	crime	gangs,	but	also	what	is	referred	to	in	China	as	the	‘red-black’	connections.	These	are	connections	between	organized	crime	and	corrupt	officials	who	offer	political	protection.	This	strong	emphasis	on	the	corrupt	network	of	gangs,	businessmen	and	public	officials	drew	national	and	international	media	attention.	Much	of	the	media	attention	credited	Bo	Xilai	for	the	success	of	the	dahei	campaign.		Chongqing’s	anticorruption	drive	also	received	criticism.	Many	legal	scholars	fear	that	the	dahei	campaign	will	have	lasting	effects	on	China’s	legal	system.	Another	concern	was	the	brutality	employed	during	the	crackdown	on	corruption	and	organized	crime.	Stories	surfaced	about	the	use	of	torture	to	solicit	confessions	(Cabestan	2011).	One	of	the	most	written	about	aspects	of	the	
dahei	campaign	was	the	Li	Zhuang	case.	Li	Zhuang	was	a	prominent	defense	lawyer	for	one	of	the	mafia	bosses	convicted	as	a	result	of	the	anti	crime	campaign.		Li	Zhuang	was	arrested	for	allegedly	falsifying	evidence	during	the	trial	after	his	client	stated	Li	Zhuang	had	told	him	to	say	the	police	had	tortured	him.	After	serving	his	sentence	Li	Zhuang	was	charged	on	a	separate	matter	of	giving	false	evidence	in	another	case.	Many	saw	this	as	an	attack	on	Li	Zhuang	and	the	legal	profession	in	China	(Cabestan	2011).		Far	from	being	a	positive	development,	this	shows	the	dangerous	turn	the	Chongqing	model	could	also	take.	What	various	New	Left	scholars	have	described	as	an	ambitious	model	for	the	future	of	China,	threatened	the	practice	of	the	legal	profession.	Other	lawyers	who	represented	Li	Zhuang	in	his	defense	to	the	allegations	of	using	false	evidence	stated	they	were	concerned	about	the	lack	of	fairness	shown	by	the	court	in	Chongqing	(Cabestan	2011).	Si	Weijiang	stated	“looking	for	exculpatory	evidence	is	a	big	risk	for	a	lawyer:	you	could	
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easily	find	yourself	accused	of	inducement	to	give	false	evidence,	and	so	become	a	defendant	yourself”	(Cabestan	2011,	p.9).				Furthermore,	there	has	been	criticism	that	Bo	Xilai	protected	a	senior	mafia	member	from	being	prosecuted	(Garnaut	2011).	This	raises	questions	about	how	serious	the	dahei	campaign	truly	was.	Weng	Zhejie,	a	prominent	businessman	and	member	of	Chongqing’s	People’s	Congress	has	been	described	as	“the	real	godfather	of	the	Chongqing	mafia”	(Garnaut	2011).	The	anti-corruption	campaign	clearly	did	lead	to	arrests	and	lowering	criminality.	However,	if	a	senior	member	of	the	Chongqing	mafia	was	purposefully	protected,	it	is	possible	that	Bo	was	less	serious	about	fighting	corruption	than	the	publicity	suggested.	This	supports	the	theory	that	for	Bo	the	Chongqing	model	was	primarily	a	personal	project.	Steering	clear	of	such	a	senior	member	while	still	being	seen	as	being	tough	on	corruption	and	criminality	was	likely	a	safer	strategy	for	Bo	in	the	long	run.		The	dahei	campaign	in	Chongqing	was	exceptional	in	its	focus	on	high	level	targets	in	organized	crime	and	the	public	bureaucracy	and	in	its	brutality.	The	political	control	over	courts	and	the	pressure	to	push	through	convictions	were	also	part	of	this.	Some	of	these	aspects	can	be	found	back	in	Xi	Jinping’s	high	profile	anticorruption	campaign,	of	which	ironically	Bo	Xilai	was	possibly	the	most	high	profile	victim.	More	attention	will	be	given	to	the	comparisons	between	Xi	and	Bo’s	anticorruption	campaigns	in	the	following	chapters.		Under	Xi	Jinping	the	Party	seems	to	have	reaffirmed	its	control	over	the	legal	system.	The	arrests	of	several	bookshop	owners	and	publishers	from	Hong	Kong	and	their	forced	confessions	on	state	television	have	a	strong	scent	of	Party	involvement.	These	arrests	seem	to	serve	no	other	purpose	than	to	warn	any	would-be	critics	of	the	Part	and	its	leaders.	What	the	arrests	show	though	is	that	the	legal	system	in	China	is	still	meant	to	serve	the	Party’s	interests.	This	is	comparable	to	how	the	legal	system	in	Chongqing	worked	under	Bo	Xilai.	It	was	responsible	for	carrying	out	the	wishes	of	the	Party	leadership	in	Chongqing.		Besides	attempting	to	strengthen	his	position	within	the	Party	and	the	Party’s	rule	over	China,	Xi’s	anti-corruption	campaign	is	also	meant	to	increase	his	and	the	Party’s	popularity	among	the	Chinese	population.	The	dahei	campaign	was	popular	in	Chongqing	and	added	to	Bo’s	popularity	because	it	addressed	a	long	lasting	problem.	Xi’s	anti-corruption	campaign	is	attempting	to	do	the	same	but	then	at	the	national	level.	Xi	hopes	the	general	population	will	view	him	as	a	leader	who	has	their	best	interests	at	heart.		
	
Changhong		One	of	the	most	ideological	aspects	of	the	Chongqing	model	was	the	
changhong,	or	‘sing	red’	campaign.	This	campaign	reintroduced	various	revolutionary	songs	from	China’s	past.	Many	of	these	songs	had	links	to	Mao	and	
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the	founding	of	the	People’s	Republic.	Bo	Xilai	stated	the	revival	of	the	red	songs	was	meant	to	inject	traditional	CCP	cultural	values	and	traditions	into	modern	society	(Cheng,	p.424).		The	red	culture	movement	in	Chongqing	was	a	broad	program	that	included	various	activities.	The	public	broadcaster	in	Chongqing	was	forced	to	alter	its	programming	to	show	classic	dramas	and	red	song	shows.	Local	radio	and	newspapers	were	also	conscripted	to	spread	red	songs	that	would	form	part	of	a	singing	competition.	Furthermore,	a	mass	texting	service	was	launched	that	would	send	messages	containing	Mao	Zedong	thought	to	Chongqing	residents.	All	of	these	activities	formed	part	of	the	massive	campaign	to	infuse	communist	ideology	into	modern	Chinese	society.		Xi	Jinping	has	also	focused	heavily	on	promoting	nationalism	in	the	Chinese	population	since	becoming	president.	Xi’s	efforts	in	this	can	be	viewed	as	an	emulation	of	Bo	Xilai’s	efforts	at	achieving	this	through	the	changhong	campaign.	One	example	of	how	Xi	is	promoting	nationalism	is	through	his	foreign	policy.	The	conflicts	in	the	East	and	South	China	Seas	with	Japan,	the	Philippines,	Vietnam	and	others	has	led	to	rising	nationalist	fervor	in	China.	Just	as	in	Chongqing,	Xi	Jinping	hopes	that	nationalism	will	instill	a	sense	of	unity	in	the	Chinese	population.	This	unity	should	ensure	the	continued	rule	of	the	CCP	despite	slowing	economic	growth.		Although	not	part	of	the	changhong	campaign,	in	2010	the	local	government	announced	a	community	service	plan.	As	part	of	the	plan	urban	born	students	will	be	sent	to	work	in	the	countryside	for	a	period	of	up	to	a	month.	This	echoes	a	similar	program,	albeit	on	a	much	smaller	scale,	during	the	Cultural	Revolution	when	students,	including	Bo	Xilai,	Xi	Jinping	and	others	were	sent	to	the	countryside	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	Chinese	society.	The	local	government	stated	the	plan	would	help	overcome	the	increasing	gap	between	urban	and	rural	citizens	and	students	would	learn	practical	skills	(Branigan	2010).	All	of	this	forms	part	of	Bo	Xilai’s	wish	to	position	himself	and	the	Chongqing	model	as	the	populist	alternative	for	China’s	future	development.		
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The	economics	of	the	Chongqing	Model	
	
	 The	Chongqing	model	also	contained	a	strong	economic	focus	that	has	been	widely	written	about.	Various	scholars	focus	on	Chongqing’s	promotion	of	what	has	among	others	been	called	‘socialism	3.0’	and	‘the	third	way’	(Huang	2011,	Wang	S.	2012).	This	economic	approach	attempted	to	combine	aspects	of	market	capitalism	and	socialism	in	a	different	way	than	the	national	norm.	The	focus	is	on	using	strong	government	involvement	in	the	economy	to	drive	‘equitable	development’	(Huang	2011,	p.	571).	The	Chongqing	government	focused	on	using	the	profitability	of	state	owned	enterprises	(SOE)	for	the	benefit	of	social	equality.			 The	local	government,	under	mayor	Huang	Qifan’s	guidance,	started	an	aggressive	campaign	to	increase	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	in	Chongqing.	Using	this	strategy	Chongqing	became	the	new	production	center	for	Hewlett-Packard	(HP),	Foxconn,	BASF	and	Chang’an	Automobile	Company.5	With	the	help	of	government	incentives	these	companies	spanning	the	high	tech,	chemical	and	automobile	industries	all	opened	large	production	facilities	in	Chongqing.	Attracting	FDI	for	production	facilities	has	been	a	trusted	development	strategy	in	China	since	the	opening	up	period	under	Deng	Xiaoping.			 The	Chongqing	government	created	a	new	‘IT	park’	and	‘chemical	industry	park’	where	the	respective	companies	could	locate	their	new	facilities.	The	IT	park	now	houses	not	only	HP,	but	also	major	tech	companies	Acer	and	Asus.	Currently	one	in	three	of	the	world’s	laptops	are	manufactured	in	Chongqing	(Wong	2016).	The	local	government	also	struck	a	deal	with	Chang’an	over	a	massive	automobile	production	facility	for	far	below	the	market	price.	All	of	this	was	part	of	the	strategy	of	“attracting	manufacturing	companies	in	the	lower	end	of	value	chains,	using	both	the	availability	of	cheap	labor	and	the	pro-activity	of	the	state	in	improving	infrastructure	as	key	selling	points”	(Mulvad	2015,	p.208).	Attracting	large	manufacturing	companies	created	new	employment	opportunities,	which	would	help	with	Chongqing’s	urbanization	plans.			 	The	second	aspect	of	Chongqing’s	‘third	way’	development	started	before	the	appointment	of	Bo	Xilai.	In	the	1990s	China	underwent	a	massive	privatization	campaign.	Many	SOEs	under	the	control	of	provincial	and	municipal	governments	were	privatized.	However,	the	local	government	in	Chongqing	followed	an	alternative	path.	Rather	than	privatizing	the	companies,	the	Chongqing	government	believed	it	could	keep	control	over	them	but	still																																																									5	Chang’an	Automobile	Company	is	a	Chinese	company	and	therefore	doesn’t	count	as	FDI.	Ensuring	the	company	created	a	new	production	center	in	Chongqing	followed	a	similar	strategy	as	with	the	foreign	firms.	For	this	reason	it	is	included	in	the	list	above.		
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instill	the	desired	market	pressures	to	ensure	efficiency	and	productivity.	It	managed	to	do	this	through	an	“appreciation	of	the	leasing	price	of	publicly	held	lands	to	fund	their	market	restructuring”	(Mulvad	2015,	p.212).			 This	was	partially	achieved	by	the	creation	of	a	government-owned	assets	management	company	that	took	over	from	the	Industrial	and	Commercial	Bank	of	China	(ICBC)	“’no	good	assets’”	(Huang	P.	2011,	p.	579),	or	in	other	words	underperforming	state-owned	firms.	Simultaneously	the	municipal	government	created	eight	government-owned	investment	firms	for	infrastructural	development	and	public	utilities.	The	government-owned	assets	management	company	could	then	use	its	assets	as	security	for	loans	to	provide	funding	for	investing	in	public	projects	through	the	various	government-owned	investment	firms.			 In	this	way	the	local	government	was	able	to	turn	these	SOEs	into	sources	of	significant	income.	As	these	companies	competed	under	market	conditions	and	began	positing	profits,	the	local	government	could	directly	benefit	from	this.	In	deciding	how	the	local	government	should	spend	this	money	the	ideological	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model	came	into	play.	Profits	were	used	to	“lower	taxation	of	companies	and	individuals”,	invest	in	public	infrastructure	projects	and	the	various	social	welfare	reforms	discussed	earlier	(Mulvad	2015,	p.212).			 The	economic	strategy	in	Chongqing	showed	positive	results.	Between	2002	and	2011	the	public	ownership	of	assets	grew	by	a	factor	of	eight,	“from	170	billion	yuan	in	2002	to	1,386	billion	at	the	end	of	June	2011”	(Cui	2011,	p.	654).	Simultaneously	the	private	sector	also	grew,	from	38.8	percent	of	Chongqing’s	GDP	in	2001	to	61.2	percent	in	2010	(Cui	2011,	p.	654).	These	figures	show	that	the	local	government	was	able	to	successfully	use	its	control	over	SOEs	to	grow	the	local	economy	while	not	crowding	out	the	private	sector.	This	is	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	tax	on	enterprises	in	Chongqing	during	this	period	was	lower	than	the	national	rate,	15	percent	compared	to	33	percent	respectively.		The	‘third	hand’	is	thus	the	use	of	government	intervention	in	the	market	in	order	to	drive	investment	in	social	equality.	The	economic	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model	offers	an	interesting	viewpoint	from	which	to	analyze	the	existence	of	the	model	itself.	The	various	social	policies	listed	earlier	offer	innovative	solutions	to	national	problems,	but	by	themselves	do	not	constitute	a	truly	different	vision	for	China’s	future.	The	economic	theory	underlying	these	policies	might	offer	exactly	this.					 	As	policy	experimentation	has	been	an	element	of	Chinese	politics	since	the	early	days	of	the	CCP,	this	alone	cannot	make	a	political	model.	Had	the	Chongqing	model	only	consisted	of	the	various	social	welfare	policies	written	about	above	there	would	be	too	little	evidence	to	support	calling	it	a	model	for	Chinese	society.	The	Chongqing	model	did	offer	a	more	clear	focus	on	‘dividing	the	cake	more	equally’,	but	this	is	not	enough.		
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	 Coupling	the	focus	on	social	equality	with	and	economic	theory	that	offers	new	solutions	to	achieving	this	offers	a	more	compelling	argument	for	the	status	of	a	political	model.	The	‘third	hand’	approach	underpinned	all	of	the	policy	innovation	and	created	a	framework	that	allowed	for	an	increased	focus	on	social	equality.	Similarly,	however,	if	this	policy	focus	had	not	existed	the	economic	strategy	would	not	be	as	significant.	The	combination	of	the	two	is	what	made	the	developments	in	Chongqing	during	this	period	so	remarkable.		 The	Chongqing	model’s	focus	on	the	role	of	the	state	can	be	seen	back	in	China’s	economic	policy	under	Xi	Jinping.	Admittedly	Xi	Jinping	has	changed	the	focus	somewhat.	For	Xi	a	strong	role	for	the	state	was	not	so	much	aimed	at	ensuring	better	division	of	wealth	among	the	population	as	ensuring	long-term	stability	of	the	Party.	Xi	Jinping	has	employed	similar	strategies	at	the	national	level	as	were	implemented	in	Chongqing	under	Bo	Xilai	and	Huang	Qifan’s	guidance.	An	example	of	this	is	the	consolidation	of	SOEs.			 During	the	time	of	the	Chongqing	model	the	municipality	consistently	outperformed	the	national	growth	averages.	In	2009	Chongqing’s	GDP	grew	by	14.9	percent	while	China’s	national	GDP	grew	by	9.2	percent	(Larson	2010).6	Over	the	full	five	years	Bo	Xilai	was	party	secretary	Chongqing	averaged	a	GDP	growth	rate	of	15.8	percent,	compared	to	10.5%	for	China	nationally	(Orlik	2012).	With	impressive	growth	figures	like	these	it	is	understandable	that	Chongqing	garnered	so	much	national	and	international	attention.			In	the	most	recent	figures	for	2015	Chongqing	reported	the	highest	GDP	growth	of	any	province	or	municipality	in	China.	Chongqing’s	GDP	grew	by	11	percent,	an	impressive	feat	when	compared	to	the	national	GDP	growth	of	6.9	percent.	This	continued	growth	in	Chongqing	is	likely	the	result	of	allowing	the	economic	approach	underlying	the	Chongqing	model	to	continue.	After	Bo	Xilai	was	sentenced	in	2012,	Huang	Qifan	was	allowed	to	continue	in	his	post	as	mayor.	Huang	is	widely	believed	to	have	been	at	the	basis	of	the	economic	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model	(Wong	2016).		That	Huang	Qifan	was	the	main	driver	behind	the	economic	theory	of	the	Chongqing	model	is	supported	by	the	fact	this	approach	was	already	in	use	before	Bo	Xilai	was	appointed	party	secretary	in	2007.	The	influence	of	Huang	Qifan	on	this	is	important	because	of	the	discussion	about	whether	the	Chongqing	model	was	a	project	Bo	Xilai	was	using	to	raise	his	status	within	the	party.	As	mentioned	above	the	Chongqing	model	can	only	truly	said	to	be	a	model	when	it	is	seen	as	a	whole,	a	combination	of	the	economic	and	social	policies.	That	the	economic	strategy	employed	by	Chongqing	predates	Bo	Xilai’s	term	as	party	secretary	and	even	many	of	the	social	policies	that	became	the																																																									6	National	GDP	growth	figure	from	IMF	WEO	data,	available	at:	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=68&pr.y=13&sy=2007&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924&s=NGDP_RPCH&grp=0&a=		
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public	face	of	the	Chongqing	model	suggests	it	should	be	seen	as	a	separate	entity.	This	supports	the	idea	that	the	Chongqing	model	was	largely	a	discursive	creation	promoted	separately	and	for	different	reasons	by	Bo	Xilai	and	the	New	Left.		 		 After	the	global	financial	crisis,	growth	in	most	developed	economies	slowed	substantially.	China’s	economy	however,	posted	record	growth	figures	during	a	period	in	which	the	global	economy	was	in	a	serious	recession.	Considering	the	reliance	on	exporting	this	was	somewhat	surprising.	In	order	to	compensate	for	the	fall	in	global	demand	the	central	government	launched	a	massive	economic	stimulus	program.	The	Chinese	government	would	inject	some	4	trillion	yuan	into	the	economy	in	an	attempt	to	prop	up	growth.	This	stimulus	package	was	aimed	at	investments	in	infrastructure	projects	and	housing	developments.	Local	governments	were	encouraged	to	lend	money	to	SOEs	to	invest	in	these	projects.			 The	stimulus	package	was	successful	in	maintaining	GDP	growth	in	the	Chinese	economy.	Recently	however,	the	limits	of	this	strategy	have	become	apparent.	China’s	economic	growth	is	slowing;	it	has	fallen	below	the	double-digit	rates	of	the	post	2008	period.	The	Party	leadership	is	keen	to	label	this	the	‘new	normal’	(Peston	2015).	Double-digit	growth	rates	were	never	likely	to	be	sustainable	for	a	long	period.	So	the	slowing	in	growth	to	the	‘new	normal’	is	not	altogether	surprising.	However,	there	are	serious	structural	problems	in	the	Chinese	economy	that	have	become	apparent	over	the	past	years.			 The	huge	stimulus	package	has	taken	its	toll	on	the	Chinese	economy.	There	is	massive	overcapacity	in	various	industrial	sectors.	China’s	steel	industry,	for	instance,	produces	about	half	of	the	world’s	steel	(Jongerius	2016).	This	was	less	of	a	problem	during	the	period	of	China’s	massive	stimulus	program,	but	now	that	the	Chinese	economy	is	slowing	domestic	demand	for	steel	is	dropping	too.	Many	of	the	large	steel	producing	companies	in	China	are	SOEs.	Similar	problems	are	visible	in	other	SOE	predominant	industries	in	China.			 There	are	also	serious	problems	in	China’s	housing	market	that	stem	from	the	massive	injection	of	money	after	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	A	large	portion	of	this	stimulus	package	was	used	to	invest	in	building	housing	across	China.	There	is	now	a	dual	problem	in	the	Chinese	housing	market.	In	large	prosperous	cities	like	Shanghai,	Beijing	and	Shenzhen	housing	prices	are	shooting	up	and	making	it	difficult	for	the	working	class	to	live	affordably.	Simultaneously,	smaller	cities	are	experiencing	overcapacity	in	the	housing	market	(Economist	2016).	The	housing	construction	boom	that	took	place	as	a	result	of	the	stimulus	package	paid	little	attention	to	actual	demand.			 What	can	the	current	problems	in	China’s	economy	tell	us	about	the	Chongqing	model?	For	some	it	seems	as	if	the	time	of	large-scale	government	involvement	in	the	economy	has	reached	its	end	in	China.	Similarly	to	the	approach	in	Chongqing,	the	national	government	sought	to	boost	the	Chinese	economy	through	SOEs.	While	this	worked	in	the	short	term	to	maintain	GDP	
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growth,	the	limits	of	this	approach	have	now	become	clear.	Nevertheless	Xi	Jinping’s	current	economic	strategy	seems,	to	a	certain	extent,	to	copy	that	of	Chongqing.	While	massive	layoffs	have	been	announced	for	certain	SOEs,	the	general	trend	is	a	consolidation	of	SOEs	into	massive	state-owned	conglomerates.	In	this	way	the	central	leadership	hopes	to	increase	its	control	over	the	economy	while	hoping	for	more	streamlined	SOEs.	Nonetheless,	there	are	specific	aspects	of	the	Chongqing	model’s	economic	strategy	that	cannot	be	translated	to	the	national	lever	or	implemented	in	other	provinces.		As	Mulvad	has	shown	and	the	problems	in	China’s	housing	market	further	support,	there	are	serious	disparities	between	different	Chinese	provinces	and	cities.	This	complicates	any	discussion	of	economic	models	for	China.	Although	Chongqing	is	still	showing	good	results	from	its	economic	policies,	there	is	little	to	suggest	this	would	be	applicable	in	other	areas	of	China.	This	contradicts	the	idea	that	the	Chongqing	model,	or	the	Guangdong	model	for	that	matter,	should	be	seen	as	visions	for	China’s	future.		
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Chongqing	vs	Guangdong		 There	is	another	argument	that	supports	this	line	of	thought.	Mulvad,	in	his	analysis	of	the	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	models	suggests	the	two	were	not	competing	visions	for	China’s	future	but	responses	to	historical	development	paths	(Mulvad	2015).	Mulvad’s	argument	centers	on	the	differences	in	development	between	Chongqing	and	Guangdong.	Guangdong	as	a	coastal	province	was	part	of	China’s	early	development	during	the	opening	up	period	under	Deng	Xiaoping.	Along	with	other	coastal	regions	such	as	Shanghai	and	Beijing,	Guangdong	had	by	the	late	2000s	already	reached	a	much	higher	level	of	development	than	inland	regions.	Deng	Xiaoping’s	approach	was	to	drive	development	in	the	coastal	regions	so	that	this	could	later	be	shared	with	inland	regions.		From	this	perspective	Chongqing’s	economic	success	can	partially	be	explained	by	its	lagged	development	in	the	opening	up	period.	Mulvad	uses	the	term	‘variegated	capitalism’	to	explain	why	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	may	have	been	focusing	on	such	different	policy	packages.	In	his	view	the	differing	economic	realities	of	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	can	offer	at	least	a	partial	explanation	for	the	focus	on	social	welfare	programs	and	enhancing	the	role	of	civil	society	respectively.	Economic	realities	thus	may	have	shaped	the	foundation	of	the	Chongqing	model	more	than	Bo	Xilai.	This,	of	course,	did	not	prevent	Bo	Xilai	from	latching	onto	the	popularity	of	the	policies	and	using	this	to	his	own	political	advantage.		In	order	to	fully	understand	this	line	of	argument	and	to	contrast	the	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	models	it	is	important	to	understand	what	the	Guangdong	model	was.	As	mentioned,	by	2007	Guangdong	was	already	one	of	the	most	highly	developed	provinces	in	China.	Having	benefited	strongly	from	its	coastal	location	and	with	powerhouse	cities	like	Shenzhen	and	Guangzhou,	Guangdong	became	an	industrial	and	export	hub.	As	the	local	economy	grew	and	incomes	grew	with	it,	foreign	companies	began	looking	at	inland	Chinese	cities	because	of	their	relative	costs.	Guangdong	as	a	result	began	to	focus	on	climbing	in	the	global	value	chain.	Thus	Guangdong	invested	in	“…	[research	and	development],	design,	marketing,	and	sales	at	the	commencement	and	logistics	at	the	culmination”	(Kuhn	2009,	quoted	in	Mulvad	2015,	p.	208).				In	order	to	reach	this	goal	the	Guangdong	local	government	offered	tax	incentives,	better	protection	of	intellectual	property	and	grants	to	small	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs)	(Mulvad	2015).	As	Guangdong’s	economy	began	focusing	more	on	innovation	it	benefited	from	Chongqing	and	other	inland	cities	that	were	attracting	foreign	investment	in	large	production	facilities.	Guangdong	had	fulfilled	a	similar	role	vis-à-vis	Hong	Kong	for	decades.	In	this	way	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	formed	a	symbiotic	relationship	within	the	Chinese	
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and	global	economy.	Chongqing	would	have	had	more	difficulty	attracting	foreign	investment	to	make	its	economic	model	work	if	Guangdong	and	other	coastal	provinces	had	not	been	going	through	their	own	economic	developments.	This	further	weakens	the	case	for	Chongqing’s	economic	strategy	being	a	model	for	all	of	China.	It	was	and	is	successful	in	Chongqing	because	of	the	specific	conditions	there,	but	it	is	not	readily	translatable	to	the	national	level.			Guangdong	became	heavily	involved	in	debates	about	the	Chongqing	model	because	it	also	experimented	with	a	package	of	social	policies	rather	than	just	altering	its	economic	strategy.	Whereas	the	economic	policies	could	be	seen	to	form	a	symbiotic	relationship,	the	social	policies	showed	a	clear	ideological	divide	between	the	two.	Guangdong,	in	contrast	to	Chongqing,	sought	to	reduce	the	role	of	the	state.	Instead	the	market	and	‘civil	society’	were	given	more	freedom	to	make	up	for	the	retreating	state	involvement.	This	took	concrete	shape	in	allowing	citizens	to	make	suggestions	and	criticize	public	policy	decisions	through	the	local	government’s	website.	Furthermore,	restrictions	on	the	registration	of	NGOs	were	eased.	Another	example	is	the	local	government’s	reaction	to	a	workers	strike	in	2010.	Rather	than	send	in	police	to	quell	the	riots,	“Wang	Yang	…	encouraged	the	state-controlled	unions	‘…	to	engage	in	collective	bargaining	with	the	employers	despite	the	misgivings	among	local	officials	who	feared	worker	activism	and	upward	wage	pressures’”	(Mulvad	2015,	p.210).		Another	oft-mentioned	example	of	Guangdong’s	more	liberal	approach	was	the	reaction	to	protests	in	the	village	of	Wukan.	In	December	2011	protests	erupted	in	Wukan	that	drove	the	local	leaders	out	of	the	village.	The	protests	centered	on	the	local	government’s	unauthorized	sale	of	land.	Rather	than	send	in	the	security	forces	Wang	Yang	again	decided	to	take	a	measured	approach	and	promised	the	residents	new	elections	for	town	officials.	The	protests,	however,	should	not	be	viewed	as	a	statement	against	the	CCP	or	its	rule	of	China,	but	rather	as	a	revolt	against	corruption	(Tiezzi	2014).	Seen	in	this	light,	however,	the	developments	in	Wukan	do	not	signify	a	‘liberal	turn’	in	Guangdong.		Much	emphasis	was	put	on	the	easing	of	restrictions	for	NGOs	during	Wang	Yang’s	term	as	party	secretary	in	Guangdong.	This	was	an	example	of	a	liberal	turn	in	Chinese	politics.	Recent	developments	in	China	show	increasing	pressure	on	the	NGO	community	there.	New	legislation	passed	in	April	2016	places	NGOs	under	police	supervision	(Chin	2016).	This	will	require	any	foreign-based	NGOs	to	find	a	local	partner	and	register	with	the	police,	giving	the	government	further	control	over	which	organizations	are	allowed	to	operate	in	China.	The	reversal	of	attitudes	towards	NGOs	shows	that	while	party	secretaries	may	have	room	for	experimenting	with	new	policies,	the	central	party	leadership	retains	total	control	to	change	course.	This	suggests	that	neither	the	Guangdong	nor	Chongqing	models	were	anything	more	than	local	experiments.		The	tightening	of	government	control	over	society	has	become	increasingly	apparent	in	Xi	Jinping’s	China.	Examples	of	this	are	the	crackdown	on	NGOs,	the	arrests	of	critical	bookshop	owners	from	Hong	Kong	and	the	anti-
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corruption	campaign.	All	of	these	policies	show	a	trend	of	increasing	state	power	in	China.	This	is	another	way	in	which	Xi	Jinping	has	taken	a	leaf	out	of	Bo	Xilai’s	book.	Xi	also	believes	the	state	should	play	a	strong	role	in	governing	society,	similar	to	the	role	of	the	state	in	Bo	Xilai’s	Chongqing.		
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Bo	Xilai’s	public	campaign,	the	New	Left	and	celebrity	politics			 The	legitimacy	of	the	word	model	has	been	questioned	in	discussions	about	the	Chongqing	model.	Some	scholars	contend	that	what	happened	under	Bo	Xilai’s	leadership	did	not	constitute	a	model.	Instead	they	speak	of	an	“experiment	or	trial”	(Chan	2011,	p.3).	The	legitimacy	of	the	Chongqing	model	as	a	model	can	also	be	questioned	because	of	Bo	Xilai’s	use	of	it	as	a	campaign	tool	for	his	own	personal	benefit.	Perhaps	even	more	than	the	individual	policies	pursued	during	his	time	as	Party	Secretary	in	Chongqing,	Bo	Xilai’s	media	campaign	was	most	radical	change	in	Chinese	politics.	Of	course,	after	his	downfall	it	became	clear	that	this	was	unlikely	to	be	the	most	lasting	change.			 	Bo	Xilai’s	public	campaign	for	the	Chongqing	model	was	remarkable	in	two	ways.	First,	it	“challenged	the	rules	of	elite	politics	in	a	significant	way”	(Fewsmith	2012,	p.2).	Second,	Bo	Xilai	managed	to	“develop	a	significant	populist	base”	(Fewsmith	2012,	p.2).	The	use	of	the	Chongqing	model	to	further	his	political	ambitions	is	also	what	raises	most	questions	about	the	Chongqing	model	as	a	political	model.		As	explained	earlier	the	use	of	policy	experimentation	in	China	has	also	occurred	for	political	opportunism,	and	in	the	case	of	Chongqing	it	seems	as	if	Bo	Xilai	was	using	this	strategy	to	improve	his	chances	for	a	top	seat	on	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee.			 Promotion	to	the	Standing	Committee	has	always	relied	on	backroom	political	decisions.	Top	party	members	decide	which	officials	to	grant	a	position	based	on	their	political	connections,	loyalty	to	the	party	and	performances	in	previous	positions.	Another	consideration	is	the	need	to	maintain	balance	between	different	factions	within	the	Party.	Officials	hoping	to	make	their	way	onto	the	Standing	Committee	never	overtly	campaign	for	a	position.	Yet	publicity	was	an	important	aspect	of	the	Chongqing	model.	Visits	of	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee	members	were	reported	in	detail,	international	guests	were	invited	to	tour	Chongqing	and	famous	artists	have	been	invited	to	perform	(Liu	2011).	Bo	also	spoke	about	the	goals	of	the	Chongqing	model	openly	in	the	media	and	contrasted	them	with	Wang	Yang’s	strategy	in	Guangdong.			 The	Chongqing	and	Guangdong	model	discussion	has	also	been	referred	to	as	the	great	‘cake	debate’	(Cartier	&	Tomba	2012).	In	2011	Bo	Xilai	and	Wang	Yang	would	engage	in	a	public	debate	in	the	media	about	what	was	more	important	for	China.	Bo	argued	the	government’s	focus	should	be	on	‘dividing	the	cake	more	equally’.	Wang,	on	the	other	hand,	believed	it	was	the	government’s	main	task	to	‘make	a	bigger	cake’.	This	was	the	first	time	Party	officials	had	taken	to	the	media	to	promote	differing	views	on	China’s	future	(Cartier	&	Tomba	2012,	p.46).	Bo	fostered	an	image	of	himself	as	a	champion	of	the	common	folk.	His	stated	belief	in	the	importance	of	egalitarianism	certainly	made	him	and	the	Chongqing	model	very	popular.	This	is	confirmed	by	the	
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nostalgic	tweets	about	Bo	Xilai	that	popped	up	recently	during	protests	about	health	care	reform	(Lu	2015).	That	Bo	Xilai	is	remembered	in	such	a	way	even	after	having	been	imprisoned	for	more	than	three	years	attests	to	the	success	of	his	publicity	campaign.			 One	reason	this	debate	became	so	popular	in	China	was	because	public	intellectuals	and	scholars	eagerly	jumped	in	to	support	either	Bo	Xilai	or	Wang	Yang.	The	liberal	leaning	intellectuals	and	scholars	defended	Wang	Yang	for	trying	to	improve	rule	of	law	and	include	the	middle	class	in	the	political	process	(Lim	2011).	The	Chongqing	model	became	the	flagship	for	the	New	Left.	Nothing	made	this	clearer	than	the	involvement	of	Tsinghua	University	professor	Cui	Zhiyuan.	As	a	prominent	scholar	espousing	many	of	the	ideas	that	the	Chongqing	model	was	based	on,	Cui	Zhiyuan	was	approached	to	serve	as	Deputy	Director	of	Chongqing’s	State-Owned	Assets	Management	and	Supervision	Commission	for	a	year.	During	the	period	it	was	Cui	Zhiyuan’s	job	to	“’publish	articles	about	Chongqing’s	experience’	and	to	‘communicate	both	internally	to	government	officials,	and	to	the	general	press’”	(Callahan	2013,	p.85).			 Cui	Zhiyuan	was	not	the	only	New	Left	scholar	to	throw	his	weight	behind	the	Chongqing	model.	Wang	Shaoguang	(2012)	has	also	published	on	the	Chongqing	model,	as	have	Su	Wei,	Yang	Fan	and	Liu	Shiwen.7	That	the	Chongqing	model	became	such	a	hot	topic	is	in	large	part	thanks	to	the	work	of	these	scholars.	Without	academic	attention	it	is	unlikely	the	Chongqing	model	would	have	received	the	same	amount	of	international	attention.	Nor,	it	is	possible,	would	what	happened	in	Chongqing	between	2007-2012	be	thought	of	as	a	political	model.	The	intellectual	weight	put	behind	the	Chongqing	model	helped	to	legitimize	it	as	more	than	just	a	combination	of	various	social	and	economic	policies.	Instead	an	ideological	aspect	was	added	that	transformed	this	into	something	more.	Therefore	it	is	possible	to	say	the	Chongqing	model	was	in	part	discursively	created	through	the	efforts	of	the	New	Left.		 Of	course,	for	the	New	Left	the	Chongqing	model	also	presented	an	opportunity.	Similar	to	how	Bo	Xilai	used	the	Chongqing	model	to	further	his	political	ambitions,	the	New	Left	used	Chongqing	as	their	flagship.	Chongqing	espoused	the	ideas	many	in	the	New	Left	were	advocating:	a	turn	away	from	neoliberalism,	a	return	to	strong	state	involvement	and	the	use	of	the	‘third	hand’.	For	the	New	Left	the	events	in	Chongqing	and	the	public	attention	for	what	was	happening	there	presented	an	opportunity	to	disseminate	their	vision	for	China’s	future.																																																														7	Su	Wei,	Yang	Fan	and	Liu	Shiwen	published	a	book	titled	The	Chongqing	Model		(重庆模式).			
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Celebrity	Politics	
		 Over	the	past	few	years	celebrity	politics	has	become	an	increasingly	popular	research	topic	for	academics.	This	field	looks	at	how	“marketing	communication	strategies”	are	used	to	design	and	brand	“political	personas,	leadership	style	and	policies”	(Jeffreys	2016,	p.58).	Jeffreys	uses	the	term	‘politician	celebrity’	to	describe	Bo	Xilai.	Politician	celebrities	are	“established	politicians	whose	public	behavior,	private	life,	or	association	with	celebrities	alters	their	own	public	persona	beyond	the	traditional	political	sphere	into	the	celebrity	sphere,	either	by	intent	or	through	accident/scandal”	(Jeffreys	2016,	p.60).			 As	mentioned	above	Bo	Xilai	actively	stimulated	his	public	persona.	It	can	almost	be	called	a	personality	cult.	His	frequent	media	appearances	and	public	confrontation	with	Wang	Yang	showed	he	did	not	shy	away	from	the	spotlight.	Bo	Xilai	believed	that	through	becoming	a	‘politician	celebrity’	he	could	possibly	build	up	enough	support	to	guarantee	a	spot	on	the	next	Politburo	Standing	Committee.	This	was	likely	the	reason	for	equality	to	be	the	cornerstone	of	the	Chongqing	model.	This	popular	concept	caught	on	among	the	public	and	increased	Bo	Xilai’s	celebrity	politician	status.	This	was	another	way	in	which	Bo	Xilai	challenged	the	status	quo	of	elite	politics	in	China.	Rather	than	settling	for	the	normal	status	as	a	top	official	but	nothing	more,	Bo	Xilai	actively	sought	to	be	a	leader	‘for	the	people’.	Since	his	downfall,	it	has	of	course	become	clear	that	publicly	campaigning	for	a	position	on	the	Standing	Committee	and	raising	his	popularity	was	not	a	successful	strategy.	However,	it	is	possible	that	had	he	faced	someone	other	than	Xi	Jinping	he	would	not	have	fallen	to	the	same	fate.			 Xi	Jinping	himself	in	recent	times	has	taken	over	certain	aspects	of	Bo	Xilai’s	celebrity	politics	strategy.	Xi’s	celebrity	status	in	China	is	embellished	by	the	presence	of	his	wife	Peng	Liyuan,	a	famous	Chinese	folk	song	singer.	The	couple	is	very	popular	among	the	Chinese	population	(Fan,	Zhang	&	Zhu	2016).	This	relationships	public	appearance	has	been	carefully	nurtured	during	his	Presidency	(Fan,	Zhang	&	Zhu	2016).	Xi	has	also	reaffirmed	state	control	over	the	media,	ensuring	it	serves	the	party’s,	and	by	extension	his,	purposes.	According	to	a	study	by	the	University	of	Hong	Kong	Xi’s	name	has	appeared	more	often	in	state	media	more	than	any	other	leader	since	Mao	Zedong	(Hall	2016).	Both	of	these	facts	points	to	Xi’s	belief	in	the	importance	of	popularity	among	the	general	public,	something	Bo	Xilai	brought	back	to	Chinese	politics.					
Bo	vs	Xi	anti-corruption	campaign		
	
	 Since	Xi	Jinping	took	over	as	President	of	PRC	he	is	often	said	to	have	amassed	the	most	power	of	any	leader	since	Mao	Zedong	and	Deng	Xiaoping.	Much	of	the	focus	has	gone	out	to	his	anti-corruption	campaign,	of	which	Bo	Xilai	was	possibly	the	most	prominent	victim.	This	anti-corruption	drive	shows	quite	
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a	few	similarities	to	the	dahei	campaign	that	took	place	in	Chongqing	under	Bo	Xilai.	Corruption	has	increasingly	become	an	issue	for	Chinese	citizens.	As	a	result	fighting	corruption	has	risen	on	the	agenda	of	the	Party	leadership.	Distrust	in	the	Party	and	China’s	political	system	threatens	the	stability	of	the	Party’s	rule.	This	has	always	been	the	top	priority	for	the	Party.			 Bo	Xilai’s	anticorruption	campaign	in	Chongqing	was	an	important	part	of	his	rising	popularity	among	the	public.	Bo	understood	the	frustration	among	the	public	at	the	collusion	between	government	officials,	businessmen	and	criminals.	Furthermore,	rather	than	trying	to	limit	publicity	so	as	not	to	endanger	the	Party’s	reputation,	Bo	actively	sought	media	attention	for	his	anti-corruption	drive.	This	was	mostly	because	of	his	wish	to	use	his	popularity	in	Chongqing	in	his	campaign	for	a	top	position	in	the	Standing	Committee.	However,	exposing	the	flaws	of	the	Party	and	its	involvement	in	corruption	and	criminality	in	such	a	public	way	was	remarkable.			 It	seems	as	if	Xi	Jinping	hopes	he	can	generate	a	similar	reaction.	Xi’s	anti-corruption	campaign	has	taken	dahei	to	the	national	level.	Besides	the	many	‘flies’,	lower	level	officials,	which	have	been	investigated	and	charged	there	are	also	a	few	‘tigers’,	higher	level	officials.	Zhou	Yongkang,	a	former	Politburo	Standing	Committee	member	and	Secretary	of	the	Central	Political	and	Legal	Affairs	Commission	was	another	high	profile	target.	In	this	way	it	seems	as	if	Xi	Jinping	is	using	the	anti-corruption	campaign	for	at	least	two	reasons.	The	first	is	to	shore	up	his	power	and	take	out	political	rivals.	Secondly,	Xi	as	Bo	before	him	seems	to	be	using	the	anti-corruption	drive	as	a	way	to	increase	his	own	popularity	and	restore	faith	in	the	Party.			 One	difference	between	Xi’s	anti-corruption	campaign	and	Bo’s	dahei	campaign	is	the	reliance	on	internal	Party	disciplinary	measures.	Most	of	the	cases	involving	party	officials	have	been	dealt	with	internally.	Some	high	profile	cases,	for	instance	Bo’s,	have	been	referred	to	the	courts	(Yuen	2014,	p.45).	This	is	different	from	Chongqing	where	the	majority	of	cases	were	handled	through	the	courts.	The	amount	of	control	the	Party	had	over	the	process	might	not	be	very	different	though.	In	Chongqing	Bo	put	heavy	pressure	on	the	police	and	judiciary	system,	assuring	the	outcomes	that	he	wanted.	That	Xi	Jinping	has	taken	a	leaf	out	of	Bo	Xilai’s	book	further	supports	the	idea	that	for	Bo	this	was	all	part	of	a	personal	political	campaign.		
	
	
	 32	
Conclusion			 How	can	we	best	place	the	Chongqing	model	in	Chinese	politics?	Was	what	happened	in	Chongqing	between	2007	and	2012	truly	a	unique	vision	of	China’s	future?	After	dissecting	the	Chongqing	model	and	the	debates	surrounding	it,	the	Chongqing	model	seems	primarily	a	political	project	that	was	meant	to	propel	Bo	Xilai	into	the	upper	echelons	of	the	Chinese	political	system.	While	there	were	examples	of	policy	experimentation	in	Chongqing	the	legitimacy	of	calling	it	a	political	model	is	questionable.	The	economic	approach	underlying	the	model	was	already	in	place	long	before	Bo	Xilai	took	office	and	introduced	a	focus	on	equality.	The	combination	of	the	economic	and	social	policies	does	offer	a	coherent	plan	for	Chongqing.	However,	as	shown	above	there	are	reasons	to	believe	the	same	approach	would	not	be	successful	in	other	places	in	China.	Furthermore,	there	are	other	examples	of	Chinese	provinces,	cities	and	municipalities	that	aimed	to	achieve	similar	things	as	Chongqing	did	through	social	housing,	hukou	reform	and	the	land	exchange	market.	Experiments	with	innovative	policy	ideas	have	long	been	present	in	Chinese	politics,	and	Chongqing	due	to	its	size	and	location	was	an	obvious	choice	for	experimentation.			 The	media	attention	that	surrounded	Chongqing	can	primarily	be	attributed	to	Bo	Xilai’s	charismatic	style	and	his	ambition	to	secure	a	position	on	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee.	The	standard	operating	procedure	for	top	officials	seeking	promotion	to	the	Standing	Committee	is	to	function	well	while	not	attracting	unnecessary	attention.	This	shows	loyalty	to	the	Party	over	one’s	own	ambition.	Bo	Xilai	chose	the	opposite	path,	hoping	that	his	popularity	among	the	public	would	ensure	his	promotion.	He	happily	used	the	media	to	increase	attention	for	Chongqing	and	the	Chongqing	model,	relying	on	the	assumption	that	the	left	leaning	policies	would	be	popular	among	ordinary	citizens.	For	a	long	time	this	seemed	to	work.	But	after	the	defection	of	his	police	chief,	the	allegations	of	murder	and	corruption	and	his	removal	and	sentencing	it	became	clear	Bo	may	have	flown	too	close	to	the	sun.			 Dissecting	the	debate	surrounding	the	Chongqing	model	offers	new	avenues	for	further	research.	What	is	the	role	of	factionalism	in	the	Party	and	what	part	did	this	play	in	Bo	Xilai’s	downfall?	How	do	officials	use	policy	experimentation	for	their	own	political	purposes?	What	role	do	scholars	play	in	determining	the	future	of	Chinese	politics?	All	of	these	questions	are	options	for	future	research	that	can	offer	a	better	understanding	of	governance	in	China.	It	will	be	interesting	to	see	if	any	other	officials	dare	to	follow	Bo	Xilai’s	lead	and	aim	for	more	publicity.	Although	with	the	way	things	are	looking	under	Xi	Jinping	this	seems	outright	risky.				
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